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In re Storar: Euthanasia for Incompetent
Patients, A Proposed Model
I. Introduction
Euthanasia,1 or mercy killing, is a subject of increasing judi-
cial concern." The New York Court of Appeals recently ad-
dressed this concern when it decided In re Storar and its com-
panion case, Eichner v. Dillon.' Both Storar and Eichner
presented the question of whether a surrogate decision to dis-
continue life-sustaining medical treatment can be made on be-
half of an incompetent patient, diagnosed as fatally ill, with no
reasonable chance of recovery.
1. The term "euthanasia," derived from the Greek meaning "painless death" (eu
means painless, thanatos means death), is a broad term meaning mercy killing of all
types. Euthanasia can refer to the positive action taken to end the life of an incurable
patient (active euthanasia) or it can refer to the failure to take positive action to prolong
the life of an incurable patient (passive euthanasia). Euthanasia may be performed with
the patient's consent (voluntary euthanasia) or it can be performed without the patient's
consent (nonvoluntary euthanasia). These distinctions are more than semantic. They
underscore the difference between legally permissible action and murder in the first de-
gree. See Note, The Right to Die, 7 Hous. L. Rzv. 654, 659 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Right to Die]. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. As used in this note,
"euthanasia" means nonvoluntary passive euthanasia. Kutner, Euthanasia: Due Process
for Death with Dignity: The Living Will, 54 IND. L.J. 201 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Kutner].
2. See, e.g., the celebrated case of In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227 (1975), rev'd,
70 N.J. 10, 335 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976) (parents of 19-year-old girl requested that hospital authorities remove a respirator
after the girl had entered a vegetative coma).
3. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
4. Id.
5. Throughout this paper, this question is referred to as the "surrogate issue." The
courts are divided on how to decide the surrogate issue. See Ufford, Brain Death/Termi-
nation of Heroic Efforts to Save Life-Who Decides?, 19 WASHBURN L. J. 225, 255 (1980).
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54, 335 A.2d 647, 671, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), held that a surrogate decision to terminate life-sustaining
treatment can be made without court approval if it is agreed to by a hospital ethics
committee, a guardian ad litem, parents, and an attending physician. Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 756, 370 N.E.2d 417, 433 (1977),
however, held that a probate court had to determine the choice of treatment for an in-
competent 67-year-old man with an I.Q. of ten. In both Quinlan and Saikewicz, the
court relied upon the constitutionally protected right of privacy which, they said, pro-
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Part II of this note details the facts of Storar and Eichner.
Part III explores the legal principles governing these cases, in-
cluding the doctrines of informed consent and the right of pri-
vacy. Part IV examines how the court of appeals applied these
principles and Part V analyzes the court's decisions. After con-
cluding that neither informed consent nor the right of privacy
are adequate doctrines with which to decide euthanasia cases,
Part VI proposes a model which provides constructive guidance
to those upon whom the burden of making a surrogate decision
is placed.
II. Facts"
Eichner concerned Brother Joseph Fox, an 83-year-old
member of a Catholic religious order, whose life was being main-
tained on a respirator in a permanent vegetative state.7 He en-
tered this state following a hernia operation during which he
suffered cardiac arrest, with resulting loss of oxygen to the brain
and substantial brain damage.' Before the operation rendered
him incompetent, Brother Fox had indicated that he would not
wish to be placed on a respirator if he ever entered a vegetative
state. He had first expressed his desire in 1976, when his reli-
gious order, the Society of Mary, discussed the implications of
the Quinlan case; and later, after the Pope had announced that
Catholicism permitted the termination of extraordinary life-sup-
port systems.'
Father Phillip Eichner, the director of the Society, asked
the hospital to remove the respirator on the ground that contin-
uing it was against the patient's wishes expressed prior to be-
tects individuals from an unwarranted infringement of bodily integrity. In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 41, 335 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 738-39,
370 N.E.2d at 424.
See infra text accompanying notes 42-51. See also In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App.
Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978), which further limits Saikewicz.
6. The facts presented are from the two consolidated cases which are cited together
as In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
7. Id. at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 371-72, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270. Brother Fox's desires were
expressed during formal discussions prompted by the concern of his religious order to




coming incompetent. He made this request after consulting phy-
sicians regarding the hopelessness of Brother Fox's condition.' 0
The hospital refused to discontinue the respirator without a
court order."
In re Storar concerned John Storar, a profoundly retarded
52-year-old man with terminal cancer of the bladder. 2 He had
been a member of a state facility, the Newark Development
Center, since he was five, and had the mental age of about eigh-
teen months.13 In 1979, physicians at the Center noticed blood
in his urine and, after diagnostic tests, determined that he had
cancer of the bladder. 4 After a period of remission, physicians
again noticed blood in his urine and concluded that the cancer
was terminal.15 In an effort to compensate for the loss of blood,
the physicians recommended that he undergo blood transfusions
which, while painful, were needed to sustain the patient's life."
John Storar's mother was his legal guardian and closest rel-
ative.17 She resided near the facility and had visited him daily
from the time he was institutionalized. 8 Upon learning of the
need for transfusions, she consented but later withdrew her con-
sent believing that it would only prolong his discomfort and be
against his wishes were he able to express them.' 9 A state offi-
cial then brought a proceeding, pursuant to section 33.03 of the
Mental Hygiene Law, 0  seeking permission to continue
transfusions.2
In each case, the trial courts and appellate divisions held
that treatment should be discontinued.22 The orders of the lower
10. Id. at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269-70. Father Eichner consulted
two neurosurgeons who confirmed the attending physicians' diagnosis that Brother Fox
had lost the ability to breathe spontaneously and would require a respirator to maintain
him in a permanent vegetative state.
11. Id. at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
12. Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270-71.
13. Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
14. Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68-69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270-71.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 373-74, 420 N.E.2d at 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
17. Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 375, 420 N.E.2d at 69-70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
20. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.03 (McKinney 1978).
21. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 373-74, 420 N.E.2d at 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
22. Id. at 369, 420 N.E.2d at 66, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 268. In In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d
1983]
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courts were stayed, however, and treatment continued pending
appeal. In the interim, both patients died. The court of appeals
reviewed the cases despite the mootness of their issues, reversing
Storar and modifying Eichner.25
In Eichner, the court of appeals held that the removal of
Brother Fox's respirator was supported by the common law right
of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment, even if neces-
sary to sustain life.24 The court reasoned that since, prior to be-
coming incompetent, Brother Fox had manifestly refused to be
placed on a respirator, removal was authorized at Father
Eichner's request.2 5 In Storar, by contrast, the court declined to
apply this common law theory since at no time in his life had
John Storar been competent. Instead, the court ruled that John
Storar was functionally an infant, and held that while the parent
of an infant has the right to consent to medical treatment on an
infant's behalf, he may not deprive the infant of lifesaving treat-
ment.26 The court also invoked the principle of parens patriae,
reasoning that the state's interest in protecting the welfare of
the child outweighs a parent's interest in refusing medical
treatment."
431, 460-61, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 536 (1980), the trial court based its decision on the com-
mon law right of bodily self-determination and the constitutionally protected right of
privacy. In In re Storar, 106 Misc. 2d 880, 433 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County
1980), the trial court based its decision on an individual's right to decide what will be
done to his own body and held that when a patient is incompetent, this right can be
exercised by another on his behalf.
23. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 370, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
24. Id. at 376, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272. See Kutner, supra note 1, at
207: "Every man has the right ... to forego treatment or even a cure if it involves what,
to him, seem intolerable consequences or risks."
25. The court of appeals found the evidence on this point to be clear and convinc-
ing. They agreed that this was the appropriate burden and that it had been met. In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274. See Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979) (Where particularly important personal interests are at
stake, clear and convincing evidence should be required.).
26. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 380-81, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
The court relied upon N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(2) (McKinney 1977), which pro-
vides: "Any person who has been married or who has borne a child may give effective
consent for medical, dental, health and hospital services for his or her child."
27. The state's interest, as parens patriae, is to protect the health and welfare of
the child. Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1, 390 U.S. 598 (1968),
aff'd, 278 F. Supp. 488, 504 (N.D. Wash. 1967); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill.
618, 623-24, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d




A. Common Law Principles
The law treats mercy killing no differently than other cases
involving the taking of human -life.28 What distinguishes eutha-
nasia from homicide or suicide is not so much the law as it is
written, but rather the law as it is applied.2 9 For example, those
who take life out of mercy are frequently not indicted. If the
killer is indicted, he is often acquitted or convicted of a lesser
offense." These disparities in the application of the law have
alerted the judiciary to the need for a consistent doctrine with
which to decide euthanasia cases.3 "
The state's power to protect children and incompetent adults under the doc-
trine of parens patriae has been invoked on numerous occasions to require medi-
cal treatment for children over the objections of their parents. Such intervention
by the courts has been justified on the premise that the lives of "youth, who con-
stitute the hope of racial survival and progress, [are] of vital concern to the very
life of the nation."
Id. (citing Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97, 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952)); cf. Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
28. See Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing"
Legislation, 42 MINN. L. Rav. 969, 970 n.9 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Kamisarl: "In
Anglo-American jurisprudence a 'mercy-killing' is murder. In theory, neither good motive
nor consent of the victim is relevant." See id. at 970-71 n.9 (citing PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW 721 (1957); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 194 (Anderson 1957);
Orth, Legal Aspects Relating to Euthanasia, 2 MD. MED. J. 120 (1953) (symposium on
euthanasia)). See also 2 W. BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME §§ 422, 447 (1946); J. MILER, CIMI-
NAL LAW 55, 172 (1934); 48 MICH. L. REv. 1199 (1950); Annot., 25 A.L.R. 1007 (1923).
29. 13 RULING CASE LAW Homicide § 36 (1916).
30. See, e.g., Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947); cf. Kutner,
supra note 1, at 209 n.53 (citing People v. Werner, Crm. No. 58-3636 (Cook Co. Ct., Ill.
1958), where a 69-year-old defendant had suffocated his wife, a hopeless cripple bedrid-
den by arthritis. "In arraignment proceedings, the state waived the murder charge and
permitted the defendant to enter a guilty plea to the charge of manslaughter. The court
then found the defendant guilty of this charge on his stipulated admission of killing.
After hearing testimony of the defendant's. . ." care and devotion for his wife, the court
allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea and entertained a plea of not guilty). Id. But
see People v. Roberts, 211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920), which represents one of the
few cases where a mercy killer has been convicted for murder. In Roberts, the defendant-
husband gave his dying wife poison at her request. The husband was found guilty of
murder in the first degree because he had assisted his wife, who wished to die, by provid-
ing a means for her to commit suicide.
31. Legal commentary has also struggled to provide a viable rationale with which to
decide euthanasia cases. See, e.g., Sharpe & Hargest, Lifesaving Treatment for Unwill-
ing Patients, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (1968); Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesav-




One doctrine which the courts have frequently employed is
that of informed consent. 2 Originally articulated by Judge Car-
dozo in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,S3 and
more recently affirmed in Natanson v. Kline,-4 the crux of the
doctrine provides that "every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done to his
own body."'35 From this, the courts have deduced that if a pa-
tient has control over any decision affecting medical treatment,
his right to consent implies his right to refuse as well. 6
The doctrine of informed consent stems from a premise of
Anglo-American law that each individual has the inalienable
right to self-determination.3 7 According to this premise, there
are certain decisions an individual must be permitted to make
even if he decides them irrationally or incorrectly.38 As Justice
Burger wrote, sitting as a district judge, in a dissenting opinion
to In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,3 9
"some matters of essentially private concern and others of enor-
mous public concern . . . are beyond the reach of judges. "40
The doctrine of informed consent also furthers one of the
objectives of tort law. To the extent that tort law seeks to
achieve an efficient allocation of resources, it aspires to place the
responsibility for particular decisions upon those best able to
REV. 654 (1970); Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and the Free Exercise of Reli-
gion, 42 IND. L.J. 386 (1967); Note, The Dying Patient: A Qualified Right to Refuse
Medical Treatment, 7 J. FAM. L. 644 (1968); Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment: The
State's Interest Re-evaluated, 51 MINN. L. REV. 293 (1966).
32. The doctrine of informed consent emerged out of medical malpractice suits as
courts heard cases involving doctors treating patients without their consent. See Pratt v.
Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 168 (1950), afl'd, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
33. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
34. 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, reh'g denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
35. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
36. See Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (which
held that an adult has the right to refuse medical treatment); Kutner, supra note 1, at
207. But cf. In re Collins, 44 Misc. 2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (where the
patient was compelled to accept treatment).
37. The underpinnings of the doctrine of informed consent can be traced to John
Stuart Mill. See Mill, On Liberty, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 185 (M.
Cohen ed. 1961).
38. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 61 (Supp. 1968).
39. 331 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Burger, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub
nom. Jones v. President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).




avoid the costs arising from those decisions. 41 Thus, while the
physician can best determine a patient's medical needs, the pa-
tient can best determine his nonmedical needs. The cost to the
physician of discovering the patient's psychological, social and
business needs is simply too great. Only the patient sufficiently
knows his own value preferences so as to determine the desira-
bility of a particular course of treatment.
B. Constitutional Considerations
Another doctrine the courts have employed in an effort to
decide euthanasia cases involves the constitutionally protected
right of privacy. Originally articulated by Justice Douglas in
Griswold v. Connecticut,42 and later expanded in Roe v. Wade,'4
the right of privacy protects certain decisions which are so pri-
vate that they are beyond the reach of the state. In Griswold, for
example, the Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut statute
proscribing the use of contraceptives by married couples." And
in Roe, the Supreme Court held that a woman has, within cer-
tain limits, the right to decide whether or not to have an
abortion. 5
The right of privacy as applied to medical treatment ap-
41. See Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1645-46
(1974) (citing G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1969)).
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, viewed several amendments of the Bill of Rights as creating "zones of privacy."
Id. at 485. Justice Goldberg, concurring, found the right of privacy in the ninth amend-
ment and therefore required the states to demonstrate a compelling interest for restric-
tion of the right. Id. at 486-87. Justices White and Harlan, while not referring to "pri-
vacy" per se in their concurrences, considered the Connecticut statute unconstitutional
under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 500, 502. In recognizing the right of privacy,
the Court did not articulate a definition, but rather left it to be developed on a case by
case basis. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (Court recognized the "right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (individual has "the right to read
or observe what he pleases" within his home).
45. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
found only compelling state interests can justify governmental interference with this
choice. Id. at 155. This decision rested on fourteenth amendment grounds. But see Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Court relied on the right of privacy to invalidate a Geor-
gia anti-abortion statute without commenting on its origin).
19831
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pears to have been inspired by Justice Brandeis in a dissenting
opinion to Olmstead v. United States." There, he spoke of a
"right to be let alone.' 47 Relying upon this rationale, Justice
Burger later averred that "such privacy includes the right to re-
fuse medical treatment.""1a Utilizing this rationale, a Penn-
sylvania district court in In re Yetter" later held that the con-
stitutional right of privacy includes the right of a mature
competent adult to refuse medical treatment that may prolong
his life.50 And it was this theory which the New Jersey Supreme
Court principally employed in deciding the celebrated case of In
re Quinlan.'1
IV. The Court of Appeals' Decisions in In re Storar
Although Eichner52 and Storar5 are facially similar in that
both give rise to the surrogate issue, each was decided upon dif-
ferent principles. In Eichner, the court of appeals invoked the
doctrine of informed consent in holding that approval for the
discontinuance of Brother Fox's respirator was supported by the
common law right of a competent adult to refuse medical treat-
ment."4 The court reasoned that since, prior to becoming incom-
petent, Brother Fox manifestly refused to be placed on a respi-
rator, 5 removal was authorized at Father Eichner's request.'6
46. 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 478.
48. In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, 1015
(D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nor. Jones v. President and Direc-
tors of Georgetown College, Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
49. Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 67, 74 (1979) (citing In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619
(1973)).
50. Id. at 4. The lower court in Yetter said:
In our opinion the constitutional right of privacy includes the right of a mature
competent adult to refuse to accept medical recommendations that may prolong
one's life and which, to a third person at least, appear to be in his best interests,
in short, that the right of privacy includes the right to die with which the state
should not interfere.
Id.
51. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nor. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
52. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
53. Id.
54. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 376, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
55. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
56. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 371-72, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270. The
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss2/6
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The court declined to reach the constitutional issue since com-
mon law principles supported its decision. 7
In Storar, the court of appeals refused to invoke the doc-
trine of informed consent since at no time in his life had John
Storar been competent.58 The court reasoned that it would be
futile to speculate whether he would want such treatment since
he was never able to make reasoned decisions.59 Accordingly, the
court ruled that the patient was functionally an infant and sub-
ject to the state's interest as parens patriae.' Since New York
Public Health Law section 2504(2)1 permits a parent to consent
to medical treatment on an infant's behalf, but not to deprive
him of lifesaving treatment, the mother's request was denied. 2
V. Analysis of the Court's Reasoning
A. Failing To Decide the Surrogate Issue
In both Storar and Eichner, the court of appeals was asked
to decide whether a surrogate decision to discontinue life-sus-
taining medical treatment could be made on behalf of a dying
incompetent patient. In neither case, did the court comply. In
Eichner, the court sidestepped the issue by relying upon the pa-
District Attorney urged that a patient's right to refuse medical treatment conflicts with
the state's interest in prohibiting one person from causing the death of another. Id. at
377, 420 N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273. According to the court of appeals, however,
"a state which imposes civil liability on a doctor if he violates the patient's right cannot
also hold him criminally responsible if he respects that right." Id.
Unless "cannot" means "should not" in the court's statement, this reasoning is not
entirely correct. It is true that existing statutory law supports the right of a competent
adult to make his own decision by imposing civil liability on those who perform medical
treatment without consent. It is not true that the state will not impose criminal liability
if the doctor respects that right. Indeed, under New York law, this arguably constitutes
aiding and abetting suicide which is manslaughter in the second degree. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975). See Note, The Right to Die, supra note 1, at 654-57; Note,
Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632, 1635 (1974).
57. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 376-77, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73.
"Neither do we reach that question in this case because the relief granted to the petition,
Eichner, is adequately supported by common-law principles." Id. at 377, 420 N.E.2d at
70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273. See also Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Com-
petent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 15 n.64 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Byrn].
58. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
59. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
60. Id. at 380-81, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
61. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(2) (McKinney 1977). See supra note 26.
62. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 381-82, 420 N.E.2d at 73-74, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
9
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tient's prior informed consent rather than the surrogate's mo-
tives and desires. In Storar, the court evaded the issue by de-
claring the patient functionally an infant and then invoking
public health laws and the doctrine of parens patriae.s3
It is easy to see why the court was evasive. The surrogate
issue, if answered affirmatively, may conflict with existing state
laws against homicide and suicide. As previously mentioned, the
law treats mercy killing no differently than other cases involving
the taking of human life."' It is at least arguable that if a court
were to sanction the termination of one's life at another's re-
quest, then the court as well as the requesting party would be a
partner to the "crime." 5 On the other hand, if the surrogate is-
sue were answered negatively, then the court would be faced
with the moral dilemma of prolonging the agony of one who is
presently incurable, suffering, and beyond the aid of potential
respite.6 It is for these reasons that courts resort to the doctrine
of informed consent or, alternatively, to the constitutional right
of privacy. Both doctrines shift the burden of making the life-
death decision away from the court and on to the patient.
Despite the appeal of these two doctrines, each is highly
problematic. The doctrine of informed consent is inapposite
when applied to situations where a patient is irrevocably uncon-
scious, and a surrogate decision is requested on his behalf. In
this situation, either the patient is unconscious and informed
consent cannot be obtained, or, the patient has failed to mani-
fest his consent prior to becoming incompetent.6 7 Unlike Brother
Fox, many people, for psychological reasons, refuse to address
63. See supra notes 26-27.
64. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
65. This reasoning would also apply to physicians and hospital authorities involved
in the decision.
66. A very strong case for this moral dilemma is presented in Kamisar, supra note
28, at 975.
67. Despite this difficulty, the doctrine of informed consent is widely used to decide
euthanasia cases. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, reh'g denied,
187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 268-69, 104 N.W. 12,
14-15 (1905); Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914);
Note, Suicide and the Compulsion of Life Saving Medical Procedures: An Analysis of
the Refusal of Treatment Cases, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 285, 293 (1978) (citing Palm
Springs Gen. Hosp. v. Martinez, Civ. No. 71-12,687 (Dade County Cir. Ct., filed July 2,
1971)); Byrn, supra note 49, at 13 n.58 (citing Palm Springs Gen. Hosp. v. Martinez, Civ.




the issue of euthanasia when they are healthy and competent.2
And for those who do address the issue at a time when they are
healthy and competent, it is arguable that their decisions would
differ when faced with an actual life-death situation.
The right of privacy is similarly of questionable utility. 9
First, it is by no means settled that the right of privacy encom-
passes the right to die. Quinlan70 notwithstanding, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly declined to consider whether the right to
die is an incident of the right of privacy." Second, even if there
68. See Preface to E. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH at ix (1973):
[T]he idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal like nothing else; it is
a mainspring of human activity - activity designed largely to avoid the fatality of
death, to overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny of man.
Id.
Becker's thesis raises the possibility that under no conditions can a person make a
rational decision about his own death, but rather he is always in extremis hence non
compos mentis concerning his ultimate destiny. See generally Hearings to Explore the
Problems of Treating Terminally Ill Patients Before the Special Senate Committee on
Aging, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 68-70 (1972) (statement of W. Reich, Sr. Research Scholar,
Georgetown U.); N. BROWN, LIFE AGAINST DEATH: THE PSYCHOANALYTICAL MEANING OF
HISTORY (1959); R. DUMONT & D. Foss, THE AMERICAN VIEW OF DEATH: ACCEPTANCE OR
DENIAL? (1972); S. GROF & J. HALIFAX, THE HUMAN ENCOUNTER WITH DEATH (1977); M.
HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (1962); R. KASTENBAUM & R. AISENBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF DEATH (1972); S. KIERKEGAARD, THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH (1954); E. KUBLER-Ross,
ON DEATH AND DYING (1969); J. MEYER, DEATH AND NEUROSIS (1975); A. WEISMAN, ON
DYING AND DENYING (1972); Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE
L.J. 1632 (1974). This list is not exhaustive. See also Kamisar, supra note 28, at 989 n.56
(citing J. Walsh, Life is Sacred, 94 THE FORUM, 333, 333-34), which recalls the following
Aesop's fable that illustrates Becker's thesis:
It was a bitter-cold day in the wintertime, and an old man was gathering branches
in the forest to make a fire at home. The branches were covered with ice, many of
them were frozen and had to be pulled apart, and his discomfort was intense.
Finally the poor old fellow became so thoroughly wrought up by his suffering that
he called loudly upon death to come. To his surprise, Death came at once and
asked what he wanted. Very hastily the old man replied, "Oh, nothing; nothing
except to help me carry this bundle of sticks home so that I may make a fire."
Id.
69. For an interesting discussion concerning the relative merits of informed consent
and the right of privacy, see In re Storar: The Right to Die and Incompetent Patients,
43 U. PITT. L. REV. 1087, 1097-98 (1982).
70. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New
Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
71. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 376, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73. Based
on recent decisions, however, it would appear that if and when the Supreme Court does
finally decide the issue, it will rule in favor of a patient's right to refuse ordinary medical
treatment based on the right of privacy. The Court's decisive 7-2 margin in Roe v.




is a constitutionally protected right to die, it may not be exerciz-
able by third parties since the law generally grants standing only
to those parties whose own constitutional rights have been
violated. 2
By a careful ellipsis, the court of appeals refused to address
the problems raised by these two doctrines. Of course, one could
argue that for this very reason its decision is sound, since di-
rectly deciding the surrogate issue might raise greater problems
than it would ostensibly solve. Opponents of third-party deci-
sions frequently fear that allowing surrogate decisions in some
cases, for example, where a patient is terminally ill, suffering,
and has no reasonable chance of recovery, opens the door to al-
lowing third party decisions in other cases, such as where a per-
son has outgrown his usefulness to society, or where a person is
prone to criminal activity and is "beyond rehabilitation. '7 3 Hav-
ing entertained the surrogate issue however, the court of appeals
should have addressed these subsidiary issues directly. As Judge
Jones argued in dissent, the majority's decision fails to provide
constructive guidance to the person on whom the burden of
making a surrogate decision falls. 4
B. Departing From the Doctrine of Mootness
The court's evasiveness is further compounded by the fact
this issue, see Brant, The Right to Die in Peace: Substituted Consent and the Mentally
Incompetent, 11 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 959 (1977); Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy, and the Han-
dling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1977); Delgado, Eutha-
nasia Reconsidered - The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy, 17 ArMz.
L. REV. 474 (1975).
72. See Collester, Death, Dying and the Law: A Prosecutorial View of the Quinlan
Case, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 304 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Collester].
73. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
74. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 383, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276 (1981)
(Jones, J., dissenting). Judge Fuchsberg argued that the majority went too far after in-
canting the need for judicial restraint. Id. at 391-92, 420 N.E.2d at 79, 438 N.Y.S.2d at
281.
At least one commentator has argued that since mercy killers are rarely indicted, the
surrogate problem is more illusory than real. See Kamisar, supra note 28, at 971. Others
have argued that public confidence in the administration of law requires consistency of
judgment and guidance as to moral conduct, neither of which are provided by reliance
upon prosecutorial discretion or jury nullification. See Collester, supra note 72, at 313
(citing Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. REV.




that it decided moot issues. As a general rule, courts may not
decide moot questions, only actual cases or controversies."5 An
exception to this rule permits courts to review moot questions if
there is a showing of: (1) significant questions not previously
passed on; (2) a likelihood of repetition; and (3) phenomena typ-
ically evading review. 6
The exception to the doctrine of mootness makes sense only
on the assumption that a court's decision will provide construc-
tive guidance in gray areas of law. Otherwise, the task is best
reserved for the legislature. Thus, in those cases where the doc-
trine has been applied, courts have consistently held that only in
exceptional cases, where the urgency of establishing a rule of fu-
ture conduct is imperative and manifest, will a departure from
mootness be justified./ Since In re Storar failed to decide the
surrogate issue, but rather relied upon a set of uncontroversial
doctrines 7 8 the court's decision to decide moot questions was
unjustified. Little is gained by throwing red herrings at academic
questions.
75. See In re Hearst Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 707, 707-08, 409 N.E.2d 876, 877-78, 431
N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (1980); In re Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 430,
436-37, 399 N.E.2d 518, 521, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 633-34 (1979); People v. Smith, 44
N.Y.2d 613, 617, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1033-34, 407 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (1978); Gannett v. De
Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 376, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759 (1977); In re
Oliver, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 177-78, 282 N.E.2d 306, 308, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407, 411 (1972). See
generally H. COHEN & A. KARGER, POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS 420-421
(1952).
76. Although the appeal has become moot and academic, we refrain from dis-
missing it because of the importance of the issue presented. Affecting as it does
the administration of the emergency housing legislation in the City of New York,
the question is one of major importance and, because it will arise again and again,
one that invites immediate decision.
In re Rosenbluth, 300 N.Y. 402, 404, 91 N.E.2d 581, 581 (1950).
77. See In re Glenram Wine & Liquor Corp., 295 N.Y. 336, 340, 67 N.E.2d 570, 571
(1946). The appeal in this case involved a determination of the State Liquor Authority
revoking a liquor license. The appeal was entertained even though the licensing period
had expired, on the grounds that "the questions presented on this appeal are of impor-
tance in the administration of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and in the future
conduct of the business of respondent and other licensees under said law." Id.
78. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 383, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276
(1981). Judge Jones said in partial concurrence, "Judge Wachtler's opinion constitutes
an accurate and clear statement of the highest common factors on which all members of




VI. Constructive Guidance for Resolving the Surrogate Issue:
A Proposed Model
A. The Model of Substituted Judgment
The court of appeals' decision in In re Storar79 underscores
the need for a model providing constructive guidance for decid-
ing the surrogate issue.80 Such a model should contain a body of
operating principles which provide a defensible rationale for
making life-death decisions, and should also be simple enough to
be readily applicable. The following model strives to satisfy the
foregoing criteria.
A. vicarious decision to terminate life-sustaining medical
treatment on behalf of a terminally ill incompetent patient
should be authorized where, under the totality of the circum-
stances, the patient is a proper candidate for euthanasia, and
the party requesting termination of treatment is sufficiently re-
lated to the patient so he can speak on the patient's behalf with
respect to the patient's interests, desires, and beliefs."
To satisfy the first requirement that the patient is a proper
candidate for euthanasia, the surrogate would prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt,82 that the patient is terminally ill with no rea-
sonable chance of recovery and that either (1) the patient is irre-
versibly comatose, or (2) the patient is suffering and sustaining
his life would only prolong his suffering. Having demonstrated
this, he would next convince the court, by clear and convincing
evidence,84 that he is competent to speak on the patient's behalf.
79. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
80. See Clark, When Doctors Play God, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 31, 1981, at 52, col. 2:
"New York's high court [in In re Storar] did little to clarify the issue of terminating
treatment."
81. The surrogate issue is directly addressed by focusing on the nexus between the
surrogate and the patient. Where the nexus is strong, the surrogate can justifiably assert
that he has a legitimate interest in speaking on the patient's behalf, thus satisfying the
requirement of standing. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
82. See infra text following note 88.
83. In determining whether the surrogate has met his burden, the court would
make, sua sponte, a motion to dismiss, and then determine whether the surrogate has
presented enough evidence to withstand this motion.
84. In light of the court of appeals' discussion concerning the quantum of evidence
in In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 379, 420 N.E.2d at 71-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274, this would
appear to be the appropriate burden. See supra note 25. More than this may well be




Criteria to consider in determining the competency of the surro-
gate would include the following:
(1) The surrogate's relationship to the patient, including the
quality of the relationship;
(2) The surrogate's past and present associations with the pa-
tient, including the quality of the associations;
(3) The extent to which the surrogate is acquainted with the pa-
tient's past moral and religious convictions (if any), including
awareness of their strength and fortitude;
(4) The surrogate's ability to comprehend and appreciate the so-
lemnity of the decision;
(5) The reasons and motives for the surrogate's request; and
(6) Any other factor(s) which would tend to establish the surro-
gate's competency to speak on behalf of the dying patient.85
This model, which might be labeled the model of substi-
tuted judgment, withstands the canonical arguments usually ad-
adequate safeguards which the model is designed to provide.
85. There are two problems which are immediately apparent in determining the
utility of this model. The first concerns the type of evidence the surrogate would bring in
proving the relevant nexus. Presumably, the surrogate would summon live witnesses to
testify to his relationship with the patient. This occurred in Eichner where Father
Eichner demonstrated that Brother Fox's ten nieces and nephews concurred with his
decision. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269-70. Docu-
mentary evidence may be brought in as well.
At right angles to this problem is the court's obvious interest in whether there are
other parties who oppose the surrogate's decision. This can be handled in one of two
ways. Either the court can appoint, ad litem, an attorney who would technically oppose
the surrogate, or the court could presume that anyone opposing the surrogate's decision
has constructive knowledge of the proceedings. The first alternative is frequently em-
ployed in family law actions to determine the best interests of a child who is the subject
of a custody proceeding. Due to the delicate nature of euthanasia cases and due to the
injustice to the patient which would result if the proceedings were unduly lengthy, the
second alternative is preferred. It is submitted that anyone aware of a surrogate's inter-
est in terminating the life of a particular patient has constructive knowledge of any pro-
ceeding that may be brought before a tribunal. If that person opposes the action, he will
no doubt challenge the surrogate's request. In In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647,
cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), all of Karen's immedi-
ate family members concurred in the decision to remove her from the respirator. The
result may have been different if either parent had objected.
The second problem concerns the surrogate's necessity for relying upon hearsay evi-
dence in proving his relationship with the patient. This problem could be met by invok-
ing something akin to FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6). This rule provides, as an exception to the
general rule excluding hearsay evidence, that a statement which is otherwise hearsay
may be admitted into evidence if "(C) the general purposes of these rules and the inter-




vanced against the legalization of euthanasia.86 Those opposed
to euthanasia often claim that human life is inviolable and that
it ought not to be taken under any circumstances."' The model
answers this argument by requiring a threshold inquiry into
whether a patient is a proper candidate for euthanasia, which
assures the court that no reasonable man would choose to live
under such circumstances. This threshold determination is met
by requiring the surrogate to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the patient is terminally ill with no reasonable chance of
recovery and is either irreversibly comatose, or suffering and
that sustaining his life would only 'prolong his suffering. In such
states, dying persons see or would see themselves as stripped of
their dignity and character."8
A second argument against euthanasia is that physicians
often misdiagnose maladies or that new treatments are fre-
quently discovered. 9 The model's initial inquiry, however, as-
sures the court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the patient has
no reasonable chance of recovery and that a miraculous treat-
ment is not foreseeable. This reply is similar to the rebuttal
frequently made to opponents of capital punishment. The fact
that capital punishment is irreversible is not, by itself, a compel-
ling reason against its employment. As in all criminal cases, the
defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt -
the same burden suggested here.
A third argument is that giving wide discretion to interested
parties, such as doctors and family members, concerning the
conditions under which euthanasia is appropriate, creates a risk
of abuse so serious that it far outweighs the benefits of terminat-
ing life. The model, however, provides adequate safeguards in
applying the criteria under which a court will authorize a surro-
86. For a summary of these arguments, see generally T. BEAUCHAMP & T. PINKARD,
ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 256-58 (1983) [hereinafter cited as BEAUCHAMP & PINKARD].
87. Id. at 257.
88. One could argue that entering such states should be a sufficient condition for
authorizing euthanasia. While this might be true from a moral point of view, it is not
sufficient in the eyes of the law, since even in such states, a third party cannot terminate
the patient's life. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. According to the model,
however, entering such states constitutes an initial condition for third party action, with
the subsequent condition that the surrogate has demonstrated that he is competent to
speak on the patient's behalf.





Criterion (1) requires the court to examine the relationship
between the surrogate and the patient. The court would deter-
mine whether the surrogate is a relative, and if so, how closely
related he is to the patient."0 If, for example, the surrogate is the
dying patient's spouse, and not estranged from the patient, this
would weigh in favor of authorizing a surrogate decision."' If, on
the other hand, the surrogate is a friend or distant relative who
just recently expressed an interest in the patient's welfare, this
would weigh against authorizing a surrogate decision. In any
event, the court should look beyond facial sufficiency to deter-
mine the possibility of collusion.2
Criterion (2) requires the court to examine the surrogate's
past and present associations with the patient. The court would
determine to what extent the surrogate knew the patient so as to
be able to make a substituted judgment on his behalf. Fre-
quency of association and depth of association would weigh
heavily in favor of the surrogate's authorization. Conversely, if
the surrogate and the patient were only casually acquainted, this
would weigh against his authorization.
Criterion (3) requires the court to examine the extent to
which the surrogate is acquainted with the patient's past moral
and religious convictions (if any), and his awareness of their
strength and fortitude. The court would determine whether and
to what extent the patient has previously manifested his views
on euthanasia and the conditions under which they were re-
90. Ordinarily, the Anglo-American legal system gives priority to family members
over distant relatives and friends. For example, property is inherited by immediate fam-
ily regardless of how close the heir is to the decedent. With respect to this criterion, the
court may presumptively conclude that the patient's immediate family members have a
prima facie claim to surrogate competency. This presumption, however, must be
rebuttable.
91. The fact that the surrogate is a spouse or even a parent should not, in and of
itself, establish surrogate competency since it is possible that a spouse or parent is in-
competent to speak on behalf of a patient's interests, beliefs, and desires. Such a rela-
tionship, however, might entitle the potential surrogate to a rebuttable presumption. See
discussion supra note 90.
92. The court must be particularly sensitive to the possibility of collusion where, for
example, an estranged wife has appealed to the court for termination of treatment. The





vealed.9 3 The possibilities here are endless. If, for example, the
patient was an avid anti-euthanasianist prior to becoming in-
competent, this would weigh heavily against authorizing eutha-
nasia. If he was silent on the issue, and the surrogate proves that
the patient was fanatical about his religion, which included as
one of its tenets the approval of euthanasia, this would weigh in
favor of court authorization. And if the patient had indicated his
approval of euthanasia, but did so casually and on just one occa-
sion, this, without more, would weigh against authorization.
Criterion (4) requires the court to examine the surrogate's
ability to comprehend and appreciate the seriousness of the de-
cision. The surrogate must persuade the court by clear and con-
vincing evidence, that he is of sufficient age and intelligence to
make a decision on the patient's behalf. He must prove that he
fully appreciates the patient's condition, the medical procedures
that are presently available, and the solemnity of the occasion.
Criterion (5) requires the court to examine the reasons and
motives for the surrogate's request. A surrogate may request eu-
thanasia for a variety of reasons. The usual situation is where
the surrogate observes the patient's suffering and pain and is
motivated out of compassion to end that suffering.9 4 It is con-
ceivable, however, that the surrogate may be motivated by mal-
ice, personal profit, or the financial burden of providing health
care that delays death through the use of expensive mechanical
devices. The court would determine to what extent any of these
motives are sufficiently meritorious so as to effect authorization.
It should again look beyond facial sufficiency."
Criterion (6) is a catch-all provision which enables the court
to examine any additional factors which would tend to establish
or negate the surrogate's competency to speak on behalf of the
dying patient. The model and its six criteria provide a totality of
the circumstances test which gives the court wide latitude in ex-
amining the surrogate.
A final argument opposing euthanasia is that any euthana-
sia proposals which permit the taking of human life, will erode
93. If, for example, the patient had executed a living will, this would weigh heavily
in favor of court authorization.
94. See Kutner, supra note 1, at 201-02.




other strictures against the taking of human life." The model
with its above criteria, however, adequately safeguards the sanc-
tity of human life. Not only must the surrogate prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the patient is a proper candidate for eu-
thanasia, but he must also prove, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that he himself is competent to make a substitute judg-
ment. Both standards are difficult to meet and adequately
assure a just determination.9 7
The proposed model must also withstand application of the
existing laws concerning homicide and suicide. The model as-
sumes that there is a morally relevant distinction between
"causing death" and "allowing a person to die" which should be
incorporated into our legal system. There are many who argue
that there is an important difference between standing aside and
letting someone die and actively pushing that person toward
death.9 8  When a person is allowed to die it is his disease or
condition that causes death; but if an individual administers a
toxic drug, then that individual actively causes the patient's
death. In the one case death seems to be natural, while in the
other case it is artificially induced. Because of this distinction,
the law should distinguish euthanasia and except it from the
laws concerning homicide and suicide. 9 In this way, neither the
surrogate nor the court would be parties to a "crime. ' °
The proposed model is also preferable to existing doctrines
96. Nonvoluntary euthanasia proposals are said to be the "thin edge of a wedge"
leading to euthanasia against one's consent, infanticide, etc. See BEAUCHAMP & PINKARD,
supra note 86, at 258. Euthanasia proposals must always be resisted, it is argued, or
society will ultimately be unable to draw the line ending practices that take human life.
Id.
97. See supra notes 82 and 84 and accompanying text. See also supra note 88.
98. This is the so-called "doctrine of double effect." Beauchamp, Introduction to
Ch. 6, ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 306 (T. Beauchamp ed. 1975). For an interesting dis-
cussion concerning the merits of this doctrine see Beauchamp, A Reply to Rachels on
Active and Passive Euthanasia, id. at 318; Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, in
ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 312 (T. Beaucamp & T. Pinkard eds. 1983). See also supra
note 1 for the distinction between active and passive euthanasia. For an interesting dis-
cussion arising in a slightly different context see)Bennett, Whatever the Consequences,
in ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 328 (T. Beauchamp ed. 1975).
99. Because of this distinction, it is seriously questionable whether the actus reus
requirement for homicide is met when an individual stands aside while letting nature
take its course.




which have been used to decide euthanasia cases. It is preferable
to the right of privacy at least to the extent the Supreme Court
maintains its silence on whether the right of privacy includes the
right to die, and whether the right of privacy may be vicariously
asserted. It is preferable to informed consent since it is not re-
stricted to those cases in which a patient has manifestly demon-
strated his consent prior to becoming incompetent. Although as
previously indicated it is questionable to what extent an individ-
ual can ever make a reasoned decision concerning his own death,
the proposed model makes prior consent one of several factors in
determining surrogate competency. To this extent, it mitigates
the argument so damaging to informed consent theory; that in-
formed consent, an arguable fiction when applied to decisions to
discontinue life-sustaining treatment, should not be the sole de-
terminative factor. 101
B. The Model of Substituted Judgment as Applied to In re
Storar and Eichner v. Dillon
In Eichner,02 the proposed model of substituted judgment
could have been applied as follows. Father Eichner, having been
refused his request that the hospital remove Brother Fox's respi-
rator, would apply for a court order authorizing removal. 03 To
prevail, he would have to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Brother Fox was terminally ill with no reasonable chance of
recovery, and that he was (1) irreversibly comatose, or (2) suffer-
ing and that sustaining his life would only prolong his suffering.
Father Eichner would arguably have met this burden since
there was uncontroverted evidence that there was no reasonable
chance of recovery, and that Brother Fox would never emerge
from his vegetative coma or regain his cognitive ability.104 The
court would then determine whether Father Eichner was compe-
tent to substitute his judgment for that of Brother Fox by ap-
plying the six criteria. First, it would inquire into the relation-
ship between Father Eichner and Brother Fox. Father Eichner
was the director of a religious order of which Brother Fox was a
101. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
102. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
103. Presumably, a surrogate court would be the proper court of jurisdiction.




member." 5 The fact that he, and not a family member, re-
quested removal might be a factor which would weigh against
court authorization, especially since the record was silent as to
how long Father Eichner knew Brother Fox and whether or not
he knew him well. While it is true that Father Eichner's request
was supported by Brother Fox's ten nieces and nephews,106 the
court would be cognizant that these are distant relatives and
weigh this accordingly.
The second inquiry the court would make concerns Father
Eichner's associations with Brother Fox. Again, the record was
silent as to what extent Father Eichner knew Brother Fox so as
to enable him to make a substituted judgment on his behalf.
The director of a religious order may or may not have frequent
and substantial contact with members under its auspices. Father
Eichner would be required to demonstrate the extent to which
he knew Brother Fox.
The third inquiry the court would make concerns the extent
to which Father Eichner was familiar with Brother Fox's moral
and religious convictions. Since Brother Fox clearly manifested
that he would not desire to be placed on a respirator, and that
he expressed this desire after having given thoughtful considera-
tion to the gravity of his decision, this would weigh heavily in
favor of court authorization.
The fourth inquiry the court would make is whether Father
Eichner himself is sufficiently able to appreciate the solemnity
of his decision. Presumably, Father Eichner is an intelligent and
thoughtful person who fully understands the gravity of the situ-
ation. He had consulted two neurosurgeons who confirmed the
diagnosis and fully appreciated the religious implications of his
decision. The fact that both he and Brother Fox apparently
shared the same religious beliefs would further weigh in favor of
authorization.
The court would finally inquire into the motives and rea-
sons for Father Eichner's request. Although once again the re-
cord was silent, Father Eichner apparently desired a merciful
105. Id.
106. Id. at 371, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269-70.





end to Brother Fox's existence. Furthermore, since the director
of a religious order is likely to be free of moral turpitude, his
own reputation would be hard to impeach.
Assuming the absence of any other factors which might in-
fluence this decision, the court would weigh and balance the rel-
evant factors in arriving at its decision. It is submitted that, on
balance, the court would authorize Father Eichner's request al-
though a contrary decision could justifiably be reached. The de-
cision would turn, arguably, on the weight assigned to Brother
Fox's past convictions against the apparant absence of a sub-
stantial nexus between Father Eichner and Brother Fox.
Storar'08 presents other difficulties. It is highly questionable
whether Mrs. Storar could prove that her son is a proper candi-
date for euthanasia. Although John Storar was terminally ill
with no reasonable chance of recovery, he was neither irreversi-
bly comatose nor was it beyond a reasonable doubt that he was
suffering to the extent that blood transfusions would only pro-
long his suffering.
It was conceded that John Storar found the blood transfu-
sions to be disagreeable. 09 His physicians observed, however,
that after the transfusions, he had more energy and was able to
resume most of his usual activities. 110 While his physicians did
recognize that it was possible that the transfusions would even-
tually be ineffective, at the time of the hearing they were highly
efficacious."' There thus appears to be a reasonable doubt as to
whether sustaining John Storar's life would only serve to pro-
long his agony.
Assuming arguendo that Mrs. Storar could meet her burden,
the court would conduct its second line of inquiry. Mrs. Storar
was obviously the patient's mother and had an honorable
mother-son relationship. From the time her son was institution-
alized, Mrs. Storar had visited him daily and had taken up resi-
dence near the facility." 2 These considerations would ade-
quately satisfy the first two of the proposed criteria.
108. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
109. Id. at 375, 420 N.E.2d at 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
110. Id. at 374, 420 N.E.2d at 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
111. Id. at 374 n.4, 420 N.E.2d at 69 n.4, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271 n.4.




The third criterion would present some difficulties since any
convictions John Storar might have had would have been tem-
pered by the fact that he had the mental capacity of an eigh-
teen-month-old child.11 3 The fourth criterion would present even
further difficulties since it is by no means clear that Mrs. Storar
fully comprehended the ramifications of her decision. Appar-
ently, Mrs. Storar desired the termination of treatment because
she wanted her son to be comfortable, and admitted that no one
had explained to her the implications of administering blood
transfusions. 1 4 She was also hesitant about whether she truly
desired to terminate treatment.116
With respect to the fifth criterion, Mrs. Storar's motives
were seemingly meritorious since she desired only to alleviate
her son's suffering. The reasons for her request were less than
sufficient, however, since she did not fully understand the impli-
cations of her decision. 16
Finally, Mrs. Storar admitted that she was not quite certain
whether John Storar truly desired to die.11 7 In view of this fact,
as well as the above considerations, it is submitted that a court
would decide, under the totality of the circumstances, that Mrs.
Storar was unable to speak on behalf of her son with respect to
his interests, desires, and beliefs.11 8 For this reason, authoriza-
tion would be denied.
VII. Conclusion
Euthanasia is an extraordinarily complex issue. It involves
113. Id.
114. Id. at 375, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
115. Mrs. Storar had on two occasions consented to treatment only to revoke her
consent. In 1979, when John Storar's physicians first noticed blood in his urine and
asked Mrs. Storar for permission to conduct diagnostic tests, she initially refused and
gave her consent only after discussions with the institution's staff. In 1980, when blood
again was observed in John Storar's urine, Mrs. Storar initially refused permission al-
lowing physicians to administer blood transfusions, but withdrew her refusal the follow-
ing day. Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68-69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270-71.
116. Id. at 375, 420 N.E.2d at 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
117. Id.
118. But cf. the dissent's opinion that Mrs. Storar "had come to know and sense his
wants and needs and was acutely sensitive to his best interests; that she had provided
more love, personal care, and affection for John than any other person or institution, and
was closer to feeling what John was feeling than anyone else . Id. at 391, 420




such legal disciplines as criminal law, tort law, and contract law,
as well as non-legal disciplines such as philosophy, theology, and
psychology. By relying on two doctrines of only marginal utility,
the New York Court of Appeals in In re Storar failed to
squarely address the surrogate issue, thus providing little gui-
dance to those who are faced with resolving life-death decisions
on behalf of others.
The inconsistency of the New York courts in their treat-
ment of euthanasia cases underscores the need for a rationally
defensible and easily applicable model for making life-death de-
cisions. Furthermore, with future cases likely to increase as
medical technology becomes more advanced, it is imperative
that the judiciary provide clear and controlling legal principles.
This note proposes such a model, which perhaps will aid future
courts in their determination of cases such as In re Storar, and
which, if adopted, will provide guidance to those upon whom the
burden of making a surrogate decision is placed.
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